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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
The Islamic Revolution in 1979 introduced a decade of population growth policy that has had 
serious effects on the demographic composition of Iranian society. There had been drastic 
demographic changes during the reign of the two Pahlavi kings, but during the eighties the a 
steep increase in population was experienced, and with an increase average of 2.8 % each 
year, the number of people born after the revolution had reached about half of the country’s 
60.5 million by 19951. According to the Central Bank of Iran, the total Iranian population had 
in the summer of 2006 reached 69,5 million2, in comparison to 39 million in 19803. Almost 
thirty years after the revolution and Ayatollah Khomeini’s famous outcry to create an Islamic 
army of 20 million young Iranians the regime has literarily been left holding the baby, and is 
now seeing the children born after the revolution entering into higher education and the 
national labour force. As a result Iran now possesses one of the youngest populations in the 
world, where approximately 40 % is under the age of 15, and where the youth population4 in 
2003 constituted 33,7 % of the total population5. Because of the population’s young age, it is 
prospected that the number of people seeking higher education and employment during the 
next five years will continue to increase, something that will sustain the challenge of 
providing jobs for the continuous stream of high school and university graduates. During the 
period 1996-2000 there was on average created 296,750 new jobs each year, in contrast to the 
692,750 of new job seekers that were entering the labour market6. The Islamic Republic’s 
Third Five-Year Development Plan for 1379-1383 (2000/2001-2004/2005) estimated that 
760,000 new jobs had to be created each year in the prospected period in order to absorb the 
new job seekers. During these five years the Iranian economy has experienced considerable 
growth, and the real GDP per capita has increased by 28 %7. However, the High Employment 
Council, chaired by president Khatami, in 2004 published the employment numbers for the 
four first years, and it showed that the numbers were in deficit with jobs created each year 
                                                 
1
 Brumberg, Daniel: Reinventing Khomeini: The Struggle for Reform in Iran, The University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago, 2001, p. 188. 
2
 Central Bank of Iran: Economical Trends No. 45 Second Quarter 1385 (2006/2007), p. 1. 
3
 Brumberg, Daniel: Reinventing Khomeini, p. 188. 
4
 Youth is in this paper defined as population aged 15 to 24 years. In official Iranian statistical sources the 
definition of youth varies from 15-24 years to 15-29 years. Where the latter definition is used this will be 
mentioned in the text. 
5
 National Youth Organisation: Youth Employment in Islamic Republic of Iran, Department of International 
Affairs, Tehran, 2004, p. 3. 
6
 Valadkhani, Abbas: Unemployment Conundrum in Iran, University of Wollgong Economic Working Paper 
Series, 2006, p.1. 
7
 Salehi-Isfahani, Djavad: Human capital policy for Iran: toward integrated reform in education, labor market 
and social protection, UNDP Tehran, May 2005, p. 11. 
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counting 431,000, 493,000, 690,000, and 700,000 respectively8. In somewhat contrast to these 
numbers official statistical sources are showing that there has been a reduction in the total 
national unemployment rate from 14.3 % in 1379 to 10.4 % in 1383. The reduction has 
especially been seen among worker from 30 to 64 years, where unemployment has decreased 
from 6 % in 1379 to 3.2 % in 1383. Women participation in the labour force is increasing for 
each year, and parallel to this, overall unemployment for women has increased slightly from 
17.0 % to 18.3 % in the same period9. There has been an increase in the number of people 
defined as participating in the active labour force, from 37.2 % in 1379 to 38.4 % in 1383. 
 At the same time as the overall unemployment has decreased it has remained difficult 
for youth to find jobs, and high youth unemployment has persisted throughout the five years 
of strong economic growth. Although youth unemployment decreased from 34.2 % 1380 to 
25.2 % in 1384, the national the rate for youth unemployment is still more than twice the 
overall rate, and according to statistics it is almost exclusively a larger problem in urban than 
rural areas 
 
Table 1.1 Activity rate in total population and unemployment rate in total population, total youth 
population, and among urban youth, 1379-1383. 
 
Year Total activity rate Total unemployment Youth unemployment Urban youth 
unemployment 
1379 37.2 % 14.3 % - - 
1380 37.2 % 14.8 % 34.2 % 37.4 % 
1381 37.2 % 12.8 % 26.7 % 32.2 % 
1382 38.1 % 11.8 % 25.5 % 30.5 % 
1383 38.4 % 10.4 % 24.1 % 28.9 % 
1384 - 11.0 %* 25.2 % 29.4 % 
Sources: Statistical Centre of Iran: Statistical Yearbook for Iran 1383; Statistical Centre of Iran: Statistical 
Collection of the Condition of Households, Bahman 1380, Mordad 1381, Mordad 1382, Spring 1383.  
* Source: Central Bank of Iran: Economic Trends No. 44, First Quarter 1385 (2006/2007), p.1. 
 
 This paper is a research on the main causes of sustained high urban youth 
unemployment in Iran. It considers the phenomenon based on structural and classical 
explanations to unemployment, and argues that based on these explanations the high 
unemployment rate among urban youth is based in human capital development deficiencies. 
                                                 
8
 Amuzegar, Jahangir: Iran’s Unemployment Crisis, in: Middle East Economic Survey, October 2004.   
9
 Salehi-Isfahani, Djavad: Human capital policy for Iran, p. 12.  
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The statistical data for unemployment, economy, and education developments will in this 
study be limited to a six-year period, from the start of the Iranian fiscal year 1379 to the end 
of the fiscal year 138410. Statistics for 1385, and for the 1384 national statistical yearbook, 
were still under compilation and preparation at the completion of this paper, and not available 
for research. The research and writing process for this paper was done in Tehran, Rasht, and 
Zanjan, Iran, from the start of February to the beginning of June 2007. All appointed meetings 
with academics, analysts, and representatives of organisations and state offices are referred to 
by name, while student interviews and coincidental conversations are anonymous because 
they were held in unofficial circumstances.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10
 The main year reference will in this study be the Persian year since most numbers that are referred to follow 
this calendar. The Persian year starts at 21 March and ends at the 20 March, so that for example the Persian year 
1379 in the Gregorian calendar will answer to March 2000 to March 2001. 1384 answers to March 2005 to 
March 2006. 
 5 
2.0 DEFINING UNEMPLOYMENT AND HUMAN CAPITAL INVESTMENT 
 
2.1 Defining and measuring unemployment 
 
The difficult employment situation in Iran has led to a variety of ways for people to 
economically support their lives. The obstacles to finding employment are often countered by 
the creation of private self-employment. This might be a good solution to saving oneself from 
unemployment, but is often a way into underemployment and hidden unemployment rather 
than creating an acceptable living. To what degree this self-employment really contributes to 
sustaining a respectable income is often hard to tell, and presenting reliable statistics that 
show the reality of Iranian unemployment is difficult because it is hard to determine who is 
really employed and who is really unemployed. Iranian statistical centres have been criticised 
for producing unemployment numbers that are significantly lower than what the reality 
shows. At the same time there do not exist any alternative statistical sources. All statistics in 
Iran are published by the Central Bank of Iran (CBI) or by the Statistical Centre of Iran (SCI), 
the latter whose data is compiled by the provincial branches of the Management and Planning 
Organisation (MPO). The CBI is oriented mainly toward economical developments, and is 
also because its close connection to the government often accused by both economists and 
state research centres in Iran of creating politically motivated numbers in their reports. The 
SCI is also a state institution but is more closely connected to the state apparatus rather than 
the government, and is therefore not under the same pressure of producing “good numbers”. 
Because the statistics gathered by the MPO and its provincial branches are very 
comprehensive and based in thorough compilation work, this organisation’s statistics will be 
this paper’s main source for developments in unemployment, economical, and educational 
rates. However, the criticism of statistical sources in Iran should be kept in mind. 
 As previously mentioned, the provincial branches of the MPO are responsible for 
obtaining the data used both in SCI’s statistical yearbook of the country, and also in a 
yearbook produced for each province. Every third month a selection of households, both rural 
and urban, is asked to participate in a public survey that eventually is used as the empirical 
base for producing annual statistics11. Ahmad Khodaverdi, economist at Zanjan Management 
and Planning Organisation, says that it is expected that somewhere between 90 and 95 % of 
the answers given by the households are correct. If the MPO has suspicion that the participant 
                                                 
11
 In the province of Zanjan, where this information was obtained, the selection of households is 1000 among a 
total of approximately 20,000 households in the whole province.  
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has lied or distorted the truth, a representative returns to the household in order to do the 
survey all over again, or to confront the questioned with the answers that are suspected to be 
false12. Every tenth year there is held a survey where all of the households in each province 
participate. The last of these was held in 1385 (2006), but the results were not published at the 
time of this paper’s completion. A problem with statistics nationally and in some of the 
provinces is that, even though all of the provinces have their own branch of the MPO, to 
collect correct data might be difficult in some areas, and some of the branches might not 
always take the task of collecting the data as seriously as other branches13. For example, in 
rural areas it is required that each province has the resources to send employees to villages in 
order to stay there for a period up to one or two months and collect the needed statistical 
material14. This set aside, all the branches follow the same definitions of unemployment and 
employment in order to categorise the participants in the surveys. Thus, by the MPO a 
worker, i.e. a participant of the economically active population, is considered all household 
members aged 10 years and over who were employed or unemployed (seeking work) during 
the last seven days preceding the enumeration. The activity rate is defined as the economically 
active population, employed and unemployed, to the population aged 10 and over, multiplied 
by 100.  
 
         Economically active population  
Activity rate = ——————————————— · 100 
        Total population aged 10 and over 
 
The economically non-active population is considered all household member 10 years 
and over who were not employed or unemployed during the last seven days preceding the 
enumeration, and those classified as students, homemaker, income recipient, or “other 
groups”15. 
 Persons are by IMPO considered employed if they have worked during the last seven 
days before the enumeration, and if they have not worked during these days because of annual 
leave, maternity leave, leave without pay, or educational or training missions. They are also 
considered employed if they have not worked because of temporary closure of workplace by 
the employer according to the law, or because of mechanical defects, shortage of raw 
materials, or temporary closing without pay, and also if the leave is caused by personal 
                                                 
12
 Meeting with Ahmad Khodaverdi, 24 April 2007. 
13
 Meeting with Ahmad Khodaverdi, 24 April 2007. 
14
 Conversation with female employee at Zanjan Management and Planning Organisation. 
15
 Statistical Centre of Iran: Statistical Yearbook of Iran 1383. 
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disputes at the work place, bad weather, illness or injury, or participating in religious, social, 
or political activities. Employed are also those who are without a continuous job, but have 
worked at least two of the seven days before the enumeration, all persons that did not work in 
the same seven days because of the seasonal nature of their work (if they were not actively 
searching another job), all those doing military service, all persons attending educational 
institutions affiliated with the police and armed forces, unpaid family workers, all persons 
benefiting from government scholarships and that are committed to serve the government 
later while their education period is added to their years of service, permanent paid workers of 
Basij-e Mostazafan under the Revolutionary Guard Corpse, and those persons working as 
trainees during the last seven days, either in a field related to goods and services production or 
that they were paid in cash or king16. 
 Persons are by IMPO considered unemployed if they in the seven days before the 
enumeration were either not in paid employment or self-employment, were available for paid 
employment or self-employment, or were taking specific steps to seek paid employment or 
self-employment. If persons in the seven days before the enumeration were without work 
because of the seasonal nature of their jobs, and at the same time seeking other work, they are 
considered unemployed17. The unemployment rate is calculated as the ratio of unemployed 
population aged 10 years and over to the economically active population, unemployed and 
unemployed, multiplied by 100.  
 
              Unemployed population  
Unemployment rate = —————————————— · 100 
               Economically active population 
 
The International Labour Organisation’s (ILO) definition of unemployment is quite 
general and gives countries an opportunity to operate within an individual interpretation. The 
ILO defines unemployed as “those people who have not worked more than one hour during 
the short reference period but who are available for and actively searching work.”18 This 
brings about the question of whether to include such groups as students, armed forces, and 
paramilitary forces in the labour force. In Iran’s case students are not included in the labour 
force whatsoever, but in a country such as Norway students are included if they are actively 
seeking work. In the latter those who are doing military service are not included in the labour 
                                                 
16
 Statistical Centre of Iran: Statistical Yearbook of the Country 1383. 
17
 Statistical Centre of Iran: Statistical Yearbook of the Country 1383. 
18
 O’Higgins, Niall: The Challenge of Youth Unemployment, International Labour Office, Geneva, 1997, p. 1. 
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force, while in Iran the armed forces and paid members of the paramilitary force Basij-e 
Mostazafan19 are included. It is difficult to say that it is wrong to include such groups, but it is 
quite unusual for such rates to include armed forces in the active labour force and to 
categorise them as employed. In Iran’s case, because the armed forces are of a considerable 
size, this both increases the active labour force significantly and thus also makes the total 
unemployment rates decrease. It is also difficult to define the military service in Iran as paid 
labour since the service is close to unpaid, only providing the soldiers with IR 30,000 
(approximately $3) per day for a service that is mandatory and punishable if not undertaken20. 
In the case of Norway, the students have become an active participator in the labour market at 
the same time as they are students, and it is therefore difficult to argue that it is wrong to 
include these in the labour force, in opposite to in Iran, where it is more unusual to work and 
study at the same time.  
 
2.2 Approaches to unemployment 
 
As in most countries all forms of unemployment can be found in Iran, but because of several 
factors unemployment in Iran differs from unemployment in several other countries. 
Bernstein Morris (1978) does in a work on unemployment in capitalist and socialist 
economies differ countries like the United States, Canada, Japan, and the states in Western 
Europe, which he characterises as capitalist regulated market economies, from what at that 
time constituted a block of socialist centrally planned economies. The ones that are 
characterised as capitalist regulated market economies, execute an economy where the means 
of production are mostly privately owned, where market forces chiefly determine the level of 
economic activity, the rate of growth, the composition of output, and the distribution of 
income, but where the government interferes in order to handle problems in the economy21. 
Iran does not answer directly to Morris’ references to states with socialist centrally planned 
economies, i.e. the People’s Republic of China, the USSR, and “most countries in Eastern 
Europe”, but its economy has since the regime change in 1979 had strong similarities to these 
states. Morris argues that socialistic centrally planned economies are characterised by an 
economy where the means of production are mostly publicly owned, where the state chiefly 
                                                 
19
 All active members, i.e. those who are not defined as reserves, of the Basij receive a small salary for 
participating in the organisations work.  
20
 Conversation with military guard off duty in Rasht, 6 February 2007.  
21
 Bornstein, Morris: Unemployment in Capitalist Regulated Market Economies and Socialist Centrally Planned 
Economies, The American Economic Review Vol. 68 No. 2, 1978, p. 38. 
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determines the level of economic activity, the rate of growth, the composition of output, and 
the distribution of income, and hence where the government is held responsible and is 
expected to deal with problems in the economy22. The causes of unemployment in both 
groups are often connected to the type of economy chosen by the case studied, something 
which leads to a distinguishing between the types of unemployment recognised in the 
different countries. In the case of states such as those found in Western Europe 
unemployment is most often recognised by the following types: 1) Seasonal unemployment, 
where joblessness arises from regular seasonal fluctuations in the demand for labor force, 2) 
frictional unemployment, involving those seeking their first jobs and those between jobs after 
voluntarily quitting or being dismissed, 3) structural unemployment, which occurs when 
people are unable to find work because of lack of skills, a shortage of jobs in their particular 
market areas, or geographical misplacement although national demand might be high, and 4) 
cyclical unemployment, resulting from a general decline in business activity, with a 
subsequent recovery leading to reemployment23.  
In socialist centrally planned economies, identifiable with the economy in Iran, all of 
these types of unemployment are present, but the representation of some of these are marginal 
when looking at the main causes of unemployment. Such economies acknowledge seasonal 
unemployment as inevitable due to natural factors, such as agricultural production cycles and 
institutional arrangements, like the academic calendar. A certain amount of frictional 
unemployment is expected as long as new entrants to the labour market can choose their first 
jobs, workers are free to quit, or enterprise managers are permitted to dismiss unsatisfactory 
or surplus workers. However, although seasonal and frictional unemployment are contributors 
to the total rates of unemployment, this author argues that they are not the real problem in 
Iran. In socialist centrally planned economies, structural unemployment is regarded as 
deficiencies in planning that is supposed to balance the supply to and demand for labour 
through accurate estimates of the available labour force and correct decision on training 
programs, technological progress, location of new capacity, and real wages24. As will be 
discussed later, this is one of the strongest characteristics of unemployment in Iran, and 
especially among urban youth. It should here be added to the above definition that structural 
unemployment does not necessarily only appear as a result of lack of skills, but is also 
recognised by the acquirement of “wrong” skills or skills that do not match the labour market 
                                                 
22
 Bornstein, Morris: Unemployment in Capitalist Regulated Market Economies, p. 38. 
23
 Ibid. p. 39. 
24
 Ibid. 
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at the given time. This happens for example when the need for a specific educated workforce 
within an industry is no longer needed, or the supply of workforce is in surplus, and there is 
no short time prospects of business recovery leading to reemployment. It can also be a result 
of unbalanced planning and execution of training and education programmes, which in turn 
cause a mismatch of the labour force’s skills to the demands of the labour market. 
A second feature that distinguishes the Iranian demand for and supply to employment 
is the presence of classical unemployment in the labour market. As opposite to Keynesian 
unemployment, which is recognised as how “…notional product supply exceeds or falls short 
of market demand at the prevailing wage and price configuration, so that labor demand is […] 
constrained and determined by the inverted production function”25, classical unemployment 
arises from rigidities imposed on the labour market and is evident when “firms are on their 
notional product supply and labor demand functions but the real wage exceeds the Walrasian 
full-employment level”26. Thus, in classical unemployment, labour demand depends entirely 
on the real wage, which, if it exceeds the employers capability to pay the expenses of keeping 
employees in full employment as a cause of those rigidities that are placed upon the firm, 
causes difficulties in employing new labour and therefore also decreases the total labour 
demand. The economical difficulties following classical features of the labour market also 
have a negative effect on skill development within in firms because there are no surpluses in 
budgets that can defend such investments. 
 
2.3 Urban youth unemployment in Iran 
 
A characteristic of youth unemployment in all of Iran’s provinces is that it is almost 
exclusively higher in urban than in rural areas, only with the exception of Sistan & 
Baluchestan, which throughout all of the years subject to this study had higher rural youth 
unemployment than urban, and a few provinces that occasionally experienced slight shifts in 
the statistics (see numbers in bold type in table 2.3.1.). In contrast to rural areas, where the 
young and unemployed are typically semi-literate or illiterate and have dropped out from 
educational programmes before reaching higher education, urban unemployment is more a 
phenomenon of literate youth and a growing share of educated labour force. As seen 
previously, the national total unemployment rate has during the six-year period 1379-1384 
                                                 
25
 Coen, Robert M.; Hickman, Bert G.: Is European Unemployment Classical or Keynesian?, in: The American 
Economic Review Vol. 78 No. 2, 1988, p. 188. 
26
 Ibid.  
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decreased from 14.3 % to 11.0 %. This positive development does not reflect to such a degree 
in the rates for youth, and especially not for urban youth. On a national level there was a 
decrease in youth unemployment from 34.2 % in 1380, to 25.2 % in 1384, while urban youth 
unemployment saw a decrease from 37.4 % in 1380 to 29.4 % in 1384. There was a decrease 
in most provinces in the 2-3 years after 1380, but in 1383 and 1384 the rates started to rise 
again, so that if a table for the development in all of the provinces was to be drawn it would in 
most provinces take form more or less like a U, with a slightly lower last point than starting 
point.  
 
Table 2.3.1. Total and urban unemployment among youth aged 15-24 by province, 1380-1384 (%). 
 
Province 1380 1381 1382 1383 1384 
 Total Urban Total Urban Total Urban Total Urban Total Urban 
East 
Azerbaijan 
17.7 25.5 9.2 20.5 10.4 17.7 8.8 15.0 11.4 19.3 
West 
Azerbaijan 
27.5 34.6 22.1 28.1 13.1 20.5 15.5 23.2 14.9 22.7 
Ardabil 32.4 41.4 22.2 30.4 15.1 25.2 13.2 17.5 22.6 27.6 
Esfahan 27.8 30.2 25.9 26.5 25.9 27.2 24.7 28.7 27.7 29.7 
Ilam 61.4 64.0 35.9 44.6 39.6 47.3 32.8 43.2 35.2 43.5 
Bushehr 32.1 34.0 20.4 25.5 25.6 28.8 18.9 20.0 21.4 24.6 
Tehran 30.8 31.9 29.6 30.6 28.0 29.7 26.7 28.3 27.0 28.6 
Chaharmahal 
& Bakhtiari 
30.5 41.3 12.2 15.4 14.3 19.7 15.5 20.8 17.0 18.9 
Khorasan 31.2 32.1 19.9 27.6 17.1 28.9 15.3 20.6 17.6 21.8 
Khuzestan 40.0 47.8 41.3 51.1 47.4 49.7 42.2 45.5 39.9 41.5 
Zanjan 23.0 38.5 19.2 34.0 14.8 25.8 19.6 29.8 18.6 29.0 
Semnan 42.1 37.2 33.0 32.5 27.2 31.0 35.5 37.9 22.3 25.3 
Sistan & 
Baluchestan 
58.1 55.3 51.2 48.9 38.3 31.6 35.2 31.5 38.6 35.2 
Fars 41.1 43.7 28.3 35.6 26.1 31.6 31.1 32.6 20.2 25.0 
Qazvin 28.5 33.0 23.7 30.2 14.2 19.2 18.2 25.4 18.2 24.1 
Qom 23.6 24.7 12.3 17.0 11.1 11.7 18.5 16.6 14.4 14.8 
Kordestan 44.4 50.2 35.3 42.7 29.6 37.3 26.2 28.9 31.3 34.9 
Kerman 33.8 35.4 32.3 32.3 35.1 40.1 23.0 29.6 31.2 37.8 
Kermanshah 59.3 58.5 47.2 55.5 26.0 31.4 26.4 36.9 30.6 40.5 
Kohgiluye & 
Boyerahmad 
51.7 62.0 40.0 47.6 31.9 41.3 37.8 52.5 33.4 44.7 
Golestan 25.0 40.1 17.0 24.3 26.9 32.1 27.9 31.8 31.4 38.4 
Gilan 39.5 47.1 29.2 42.5 27.0 33.7 19.8 31.1 25.0 37.3 
Lorestan 56.3 63.3 33.4 38.1 45.1 53.0 47.2 56.3 52.6 53.3 
Mazandaran 35.1 37.2 22.0 28.7 21.2 26.5 19.3 26.0 25.2 28.8 
Markazi 29.7 37.3 21.8 30.3 15.8 23.2 16.7 26.0 18.5 26.0 
Hormozegan 42.1 46.7 35.0 37.4 35.6 36.7 29.5 23.1 32.7 36.1 
Hamedan 44.0 47.0 21.9 34.3 27.5 41.1 21.3 28.8 17.0 25.9 
Yazd 35.1 35.4 33.4 33.3 30.2 31.1 37.1 37.7 30.3 31.5 
Total Iran 34.2 37.4  26.7 32.2 25.5 30.5 24.1 28.9 25.2 29.4 
Sources: Statistical Centre of Iran: Statistical Collection of the Employment and Unemployment Conditions of 
Households, Bahman 1380, Mordad 1381, Mordad 1382, spring 1383, Ordibehesht 1384. 
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 Some of the provinces are struggling with higher unemployment than the rest, and are 
having extremely high rates for youth unemployment both in urban areas and totally. In 1380 
Iran had 10 provinces where both the total and the urban youth unemployment was over 40 
%, where the strongest affected were Ilam with 61.4 % total and 64.0 % urban 
unemployment, Sistan & Baluchestan with 58.1 % total and 55.3 % urban unemployment, 
Kermanshah with 59.3 % total and 58.5 % urban unemployment, and Lorestan with 56.3 % 
total and 63.3 % urban unemployment. In 1384 there was only Lorestan left among the 
provinces with over 40 % unemployment in both total and urban youth population, 
respectively 52.6 % and 53.3 %, with Ilam, Khuzestan, Kermanshah, and Kohgiluye & 
Boyerahmad all having urban rates above 40 %. There are few provinces ever figuring with 
numbers lower than 20 % and those who have managed to stay below twenty during the four 
last years of the studied period are only East Azerbaijan and Qom. Table 2.3.1. presents 
provincial developments in total and urban unemployment among youth in the time period 
from 1380 to 1384, with a summary for the whole country at the bottom of the table.  
 
2.4 Why invest in human capital? 
 
Awareness of the importance of human capital investment has become a significant factor in 
sustaining economical development worldwide, but many countries, including Iran, still face a 
variety of obstacles in the process of initiating and taking advantage of such investments. In 
order for a state to develop a diversified and stable economy that can include the whole 
population, investment in human capital development is especially important for increasing 
private sector’s significance in the economy. Human capital is by OECD defined generally as 
“education, skills, and ability”27. The term can be traced back to the nineteenth century and 
Adam Smith, but first in the 1950s and 1960 was the economical term “capital” by 
economists like Theodore Schultz employed in order to explain the role of education and 
expertise in generating development and economical growth28.  The United States General 
Accounting Office (GAO) narrows the term down to the meaning of “people” as a foundation 
for further interpretation29. GAO operates with two key principles that are central to the idea 
of human capital. The first is that “people are assets whose values can be enhanced through 
                                                 
27
 OECD Innsikt: Menneskelig kapital: Hvordan kunnskapen former livet, in: OECD Multilingual Summaries, 
2007, p. 1. Author’s translation. 
28
 Ibid, p. 2. 
29
 United States General Accounting Office: Human Capital – A Self-Assessment Checklist for Agency Leaders, 
United States, 2000, p. 1.  
 13 
investment”, where it shows that through individual development and increase in personal 
value the performance quality of the organisation performing the investment also increases, 
and thus is of more value to clients and other stakeholders30. The second principle argues that, 
“an organization’s human capital policies must be aligned to support the organization’s 
“shared vision””, something that includes its “mission, its vision for the future, core values, 
goals and objectives, and strategies by which the organization has defined its direction and its 
expectations for itself and its people.”31.  
This paper’s main argument, that the high urban youth unemployment rate is caused 
by a lack of human capital investment, is based in the framework of two theories that 
fundamentally connect economical development to investment in human capital. The works 
of Rodney Ramcharan and Merih Sevilir share a view that investment in human capital is 
crucial for sustained economical development, but they provide two different approaches to 
how to develop this capital.  
Rodney Ramcharan (2004) states that, generally “no country has achieved sustained 
economic development without substantial investment in human capital”, and analyses how 
different kinds of education, mainly secondary and tertiary, are compatible factors in creating 
economic growth32. This author argues that there exist countries that have achieved sustained 
economic development without a large investment in domestic human capital, referring 
especially to rentier economies where both labour force and engineering staff often to a large 
degree are imported from outside the country and where a very small part of the population is 
involved in the generation of oil revenues and economic growth, but Ramcharan’s approach 
to human capital investment and its role in economical growth is important. He distances his 
view from a homogenous concept of human capital, and emphasises the importance of how 
different types of education shape the overall development process. He is assuming that each 
skill form developed in the education system performs a specific but complementary function 
within the production process in the skilled sector, and that the ideas developed by the highly 
skilled are assumed to be non-rival but excludable, creating demand linkages between the 
education types that are external to the firm33. However, the main argument is that the 
“confluence of demand and supply forces creates a circularity between educational investment 
across the various skill categories and demonstrates how the composition - not the level – of 
                                                 
30
 United States General Accounting Office: Human Capital, p.1. 
31
 Ibid. p. 2. 
32
 Ramcharan, Rodney: Higher or Basic Education? The Composition of Human Capital and Economic 
Development, in: IMF Staff Papers Vol. 51 No. 2, International Monetary Fund, 2004, p. 309-310.  
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the human capital stock determines the long-run steady-state level of development”34. 
Therefore, investment in education should be carefully planned in order not to prove wasteful, 
and this investment should be heaviest in the initial period of both secondary and tertiary 
education in order to have a positive development. 
Merih Sevilir (2007) presents a quite different approach to gaining economical 
development through investment in human capital. She argues that through the development 
of human capital, established firms represent an important source of entrepreneurs and new 
entrepreneurial ventures in the economy35. Referring to Bhide (1994), she finds that 71 % of 
entrepreneurs in the United States found their ventures by replicating or modifying an idea 
they encountered at their previous workplace36. In opposite to firms that are established by a 
mother company, referred to as spin-offs, firms that are started by a former employee at an 
established firm, but do no longer have a direct link to a parental company, are referred to as 
spin-outs. Such spin-outs are one of the most important sources of entrepreneurial start-ups, 
especially in high-tech and human capital-intensive sectors, and they make up for the majority 
of total revenues generated by the group of recently established firms in the United States37. 
Some important questions to this method of investing in human capital should be raised, 
especially because it concerns how and why an economy should invest in such projects. One 
is why established firms invest in the human capital of employees and promote 
entrepreneurship if it results in the employees’ departure from the firm with the aim of 
starting an independent company. Another concerns what factors affect firms’ willingness to 
encourage entrepreneurship and to supply entrepreneurs to the economy. 
As a proposed answer to the first question, Sevilir argues that the emergence of 
entrepreneurs out of established firms is a by-product of these firms’ effort to motivate 
innovation and to improve firm profitability, and that the two latter are considered desired to 
such a degree that the risk of loosing employees to entrepreneurship has to be taken in order 
to gain the advances of innovation and profit. Thus, even though human capital investment is 
costly for the firm since it increases the probability that an employee will create an innovation 
that is non-firm specific, and thereby move on to found its own venture, it increases the 
probability that the employees in the long run will create innovations that are to the profit of 
the company. The decision of firms to invest in human capital is by Sevilir seen as a result of 
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a wish to strengthen the employees’ incentives to exert higher effort, which translates into not 
only non-firm specific innovations but also firm specific innovations38. The short run costs for 
the firm are high since there is a considerable risk of loosing difficultly replaceable employees 
to entrepreneurial ventures. However, if this cost can be taken the probability of the 
investment being profitable in the long run is high.  
The approaches of Ramcharan and Sevilir are not particularly concerned with private 
sector, and especially Sevilir gives many examples of public companies that have been able to 
undertake significant economical development as a result of investment in human capital. 
However, in Iran’s case, where there is a general understanding that in order to create a more 
diversified and stable economy developments in private sector have to take place, 
considerations of how to invest in and take use of human capital should be related to the two 
approaches above. The next chapter searches to what degree the education system in Iran is 
contributing to the development of human capital and how this matches the labour market, 
while to what degree rigidities on the labour market affect human capital investment in 
private sector will be considered in the chapter thereafter.  
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3.0 EDUCATION AND URBAN YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT IN IRAN 
 
In Iran the supply to and demand for employment is in unbalance. This has close connections 
to the planning and execution of training programmes, and how these answer to the demands 
of technical and economical development. The governments led by Mohammad Khatami 
between 1997 and 2005 emphasised developing an education system that could handle the 
large pressure on higher education institutions, initially caused by the extraordinary 
population growth of close to 25 million that was seen between 1980 and 1995, and that has 
continued in a much more relaxed pace toward 2007. Capacity problems in the educational 
system has been present since the middle of the 1980s when the increase in population started 
to show, and there was an immediate need to attain to the children’s need for education. 
Firstly, a need for expansions in primary education was given attention, thereafter, as the 
young population grew older, the problem moved over to secondary school. From the end of 
the 1990s and into the 2000s a serious need for expansion in higher education manifested as 
the young population started to reach university level. The governments have responded to 
this by opening and expanding universities all over the country, and the universities have to a 
certain extent been able to meet the challenge and facilitate the stream of youth wishing to 
attend higher education. However, the institutions of higher education have not been able to 
create an effective system that can give the students prospects of a safe future based in the 
possibility of finding a job that answers to their expectations, in fact to a job whatsoever. 
Suggestions why the education system does not produce a labour force that can help develop 
the economy has been numerous. However, the main discussion is on whether the different 
kinds of universities are fulfilling their task as effective education institutions, or if they only 
are helping people to get a diploma and then to push them into unemployment.  
 
3.1 Statistical developments and educational quality 
 
There has been a considerable growth in university students during the last ten years, both 
because of the government’s policy on expanding possibilities for higher education and 
because of the continuous growth in high school students that want to continue their studies 
on university level. As a result there has from the school year of 1379-1380 to 1383-1384 
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been an increase of 33.3 % in students that are admitted each year to state universities39, while 
there in the private Free Islamic Universities (FIU)40 has been an increase of 37.6 %. This has 
led to that in 1383-1384, the FIU for the first time in four years admitted more students 
nationally than the state universities, and for the first time admitted more male students than 
female. The latter development is opposite to what is seen in state universities, where the 
number of admitted female students throughout the five last years have been higher than that 
of male students, and the difference has actually increased, so that in comparison to the school 
year of 1379-1380, where 49.5 % of the admitted students were male and 50.5 % were 
female, there in 1383-1384 was a distribution of 46.3 % being male and 53.7 % being female. 
Totally, Iranian institutions of higher education did in 1383-1384 admit 35.6 % more students 
than they did in 1379-1380, increasing the total number of admitted students from 363,341 to 
564,107.  
 
Table 3.1.1 Students admitted to Free Islamic Universities and state universities, 1379-1380 – 1383-1384. 
 
 Free Islamic Universities State universities 
Year Total Male Female Total Male Female 
1379-1380 185686 90796 94890 177655 87863 89802 
1380-1381 172810 86241 86569 205026 98589 106437 
1381-1382 182009 87164 94845 221006 104079 116927 
1382-1383 257793 126292 131501 261401 120399 141002 
1383-1384 297637 154325 143312 266470 123503 142967 
Increase 
1379-1384* 
111951 
(37.6 %) 
63529  
(41.2 %) 
48422  
(33.4 %) 
88805  
(33.3 %) 
35642  
(28.9 %) 
53165  
(37.2 %) 
Source: Statistical Centre of Iran: Statistical Yearbook for Iran 1383 
* Author’s calculations 
 
As a result of the increasing number of admitted students the total number of students 
in the universities has also in the five-year period increased significantly. As shown in table 
3.1.2, the FIU have had a national increase from 836,249 students in 1379-1380 to 1,098,491 
students in 1383-1384, something that shows an increase of 23.9 % in the five-year period. In 
the same period the state universities had an increase from 733,527 students in 1379-1380 to 
1,018,980 in 1383-1384, making the total number of students increase 28.0 %. An interesting 
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observation is the high increase of female students in comparison to male students in both 
state universities and FIU. This has made females a majority in the state universities, while it 
has almost equalled out the rates in the FIU.  
 
Table 3.1.2 Students at Free Islamic Universities and state universities, all degrees, 1379-1380 – 1383-1384 
 
 FIU State 
Year Total Male Female Total Male Female 
1379-1380 836249 438640 397609 733527 387185 346342 
1380-1381 806639 416571 390068 759870 381505 378365 
1381-1382 864190 428755 435435 809567 396719 412848 
1382-1383 968206 486616 481590 923913 430493 493420 
1383-1384 1098491 568498 529993 1018980 469410 549570 
Increase 
1379-138441 
262242 
(23.9 %) 
129858 
(22.8 %) 
132384  
(25.0 %) 
285453 
(28.0 %) 
82225  
(17.5 %) 
203228 
(37.0 %) 
Source: Statistical Centre of Iran: Statistical Yearbook for Iran 1383 
 
As with admission rates, this increase in students is expected to continue in the 
coming years. There lies a great challenge in creating jobs for the continuing increase in 
graduates, something that will continue to be difficult if the Iranian labour market is not 
reformed and training programmes are not adapted to the labour market’s requirements and 
needs. At the same the increase in university graduates constitutes a large potential for 
development in Iranian economy if the resources are used with concern for the future and 
given a proper educational background to be able to participate in the process toward a 
healthy economy. 
It is important for the development of human capital through educational training that 
there is not only undertaken an increase in capacity, but that this quantitative expansion also is 
followed up by an equally comprehensive policy on education quality. An interesting 
development parallel to the increase in students at the different universities is the dynamics of 
education staff employment in higher education. Theoretically, one of the most important 
indicators to education quality is found by looking at the number of students to educational 
staff42. Table 3.1.3 shows a radical difference in teaching capacities between the FIU and the 
state universities. The state universities had a good development during the five-year period 
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with a significant increase in educational staff as an answer to the increase in students. In fact, 
there has been a decrease in students per staff from 15.7 in the school year of 1379-1380 to 
12.9 in 1383-1384, something that should mean that the general quality of education in state 
universities has increased during these five years. The FIU have also had a positive 
development, but from a more negative starting point. In contrast to the 15.7 students per 
educational staff member in state universities in 1379-1380, students of FIU were in the same 
year provided with one lecturer per 37.6 students. From that time on, the development has 
been positive for the FIU, only experiencing a setback to 38.9 in the school year of 1382-
1383, but then coming down to 30.2 in 1383-1384. Still, this indicates that, if this theory is 
accountable, the quality of education is generally far better in the state universities than in the 
FIU.  
 
Table 3.1.3 Students to educational staff in FIU and state universities, 1379-1380 –1383-1384. 
 
 Free Islamic Universities State universities 
Year Students Educational 
staff 
Students 
per staff* 
Students Educational 
staff 
Students 
per staff* 
1379-1380 836249 22227 37.6 733527 46747 15,7 
1380-1381 806639 24266 33.2 759870 54969 13.8 
1381-1382 864190 24916 34.7 809567 59763 13.5 
1382-1383 968206 34423 38.9 923913 67775 13.6 
1383-1384 1098491 36348 30.2 1018980 78889 12.9 
Source: Statistical Centre of Iran: Statistical Yearbook for Iran 1383 
* Author’s calculations 
 
There are some weaknesses with this theory, and also by using the national numbers for the 
universities. It does for example not help to have small classes if the teachers have 
unsatisfying qualities of teaching, and vice versa - an inspiring and good professor with a 
large class can have excellent results with his or her students. It does not have to show the 
complete truth for either the state universities or the FIU since some provinces may have 
excellent results while other do not have the same progress. However, these factors are more 
probable to be exceptions rather than the general rule, and so it should be possible to use these 
numbers to say something about the quality of education in Iranian higher education 
institutions. In an interview with Ahmad Khodaverdi, both economist at Zanjan Management 
and Planning Organisation and lecturer at Zanjan Free Islamic University, he confirms this 
difference between the FIU and the state university in Zanjan. He explains that classes are in 
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most cases around 30 persons or more at the Free Islamic University while the classes in the 
same subject might be taught to 10-12 students in Zanjan’s state university. He also remarks 
that the students’ results are generally much better at the state university something that both 
has a basis in the size of the classes, the strict education programme, and the motivation of the 
students43.  
 The FIU have been criticised for not providing satisfying results and, as shown in the 
previous, much of this criticism is likely to have roots in reality. But then why do students 
choose the FIU and not the state universities when there is public awareness of the differences 
in quality and additionally, that students have to pay approximately IR 10 million each term at 
the FIU, while the state universities are wholly or partly free of charge? There are two 
suggested characteristics of the Iranian education system that are important factors in 
explaining in which university the students end up. The first is the overwhelming focus on the 
concour, the annual test that determines if a student gets accepted to a university or not. 
Selection of students is exclusively based on a multiple choice test which does not take into 
consideration either the student’s grades from high school or eventual recommendations. The 
test has two parts, one general that is based on knowledge on Persian and English language 
acquired in high school, Islam, and random questions on the ideology and life of Ayatollah 
Khomeini. The second part has specific questions on the subject each student is applying for, 
and is therefore unique for each field of study44. These tests are not standardised and vary in 
difficulty each year, so that you can be lucky and apply for higher education one year that the 
test is easier, or you could see less qualified students being admitted to the course you failed 
in last year because the difficulty level of the questions has been revised. Admission to the 
state universities demands that the student finishes among the top 10 % in the national test, 
which is taken by 1.5 million students every year45 46.  A similar test, but generally considered 
to be easier than the one in the state universities, allows for 10 % of those who have not 
passed the test for state universities to get admission into the FIU47. The national tests have an 
impact on pre-university education, both in the one-year preparation school for the concour, 
and in high school. Especially private schools are experiencing strong pressure from parents 
to prepare the children for ”the big test” instead of giving the students a general education48.  
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 Salehi-Isfahani (2005) proposes a second characteristic that makes youth choose to 
continue their studies into tertiary education, which is based in the pressure both socially and 
from the government in obtaining a diploma from higher education49. This is not exclusively a 
negative feature of the education system since it is desirable that the young population is 
acquiring knowledge in universities, but the general focus in Iran is supposedly on getting the 
diploma itself, not an education that will lead the student into employment. The importance of 
the diploma has two main explanations. The first is the positive social connotations of having 
obtained a university degree opposite to not having one, and the second is how having a 
university diploma will have an effect on wage level, especially if the graduate is employed in 
public sector. State employment and wage in Iran is regulated by level of education, and not 
personal skills or effort, something that makes it important to have as high an education as 
possible – also if the subject that the worker chooses does not relate to the job applied for. 
Because the concour lays limitations on who are accepted to the state universities, the FIU 
becomes an alternative choices for students who want to enter into higher education, and at 
the same time are able to get accepted in the latter’s concour. This will provide the student 
with the diploma that is socially important, and when, or if, the possibility of employment 
comes the wage level can be expected to be higher than if there was no diploma to show to. 
 In a survey made with students reading engineering or technological studies at the 
Free Islamic University in Zanjan, which will be further referred to later in this paper, this 
author confronted the participants with the question of whether obtaining a university degree 
is more important when attending higher education, or if personal interest is a more crucial 
factor. As a quite interesting result, eight of the students answered that personal interest in the 
subject was more important, while two had chosen getting a diploma as more important. The 
participants were also asked why they chose the subject they are reading, being able to choose 
between personal interest, the possibility of getting a job, the availability of the subject in the 
university, and social causes. The majority, six participants, answered that they had chosen a 
subject that they expected to give a possibility of getting a job, while four referred to personal 
interest as the cause. The two other options were left unmarked. These results are differing 
significantly from the arguments of Salehi-Isfahani, where it was argued that obtaining a 
diploma is more important among Iranian students than choosing a subject that will land them 
a job. In the survey the participants were not considering the diploma as important, with only 
two students choosing this as the motivation for the studies, while a majority had the 
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possibility of getting a job in mind when choosing their subject. What was most common for 
the participants was that personal interest had influenced their choice in a large degree.  
 This survey will be considered more closely in section 3.2, but as pointed out later on, 
this survey can because of various factors not be taken as a conclusion, but should rather be 
considered a supplement and a counterweight to the arguments set forth by Salehi-Isfahani.  
 
3.2 Education and mismatching skills 
 
Structural unemployment is caused by that there are jobs available in the labour market, but 
the job seekers do not have the skills to get these jobs, or their skills do not match the labour 
market’s demands. Both of these explanations are largely present in Iran, and it is the latter 
that affects urban youth employment the most. In several Middle East countries that are 
troubled with high unemployment rates, such as Saudi Arabia, it is common that students are 
choosing studies that will not enable them to take part in the economical activity and 
development in the country. This has also shown to be the case in Iran, where a major share of 
the students in higher education are reading subjects within humanities, such as history, social 
sciences, and religious studies, while the government’s plan for increasing employment 
emphasises an effort in strengthening knowledge especially within engineering and 
information technology (IT). However, although the numbers for students in subjects 
classified as humanities is very high indeed and the total number of student within this field is 
increasing every year, there are some positive developments. This is seen in the statistical 
dynamics of choice of subject, where the share of students reading humanities has fallen from 
48.7 % of the total number of students in 1379-1380 to 45.5 % in 1383-1384. Additionally, 
the share of those reading technical and engineering subjects has increased from 22.4 % in 
1379-1380 to 27.4 % in 1383-1384. The sum of students in both subject groups has increased 
significantly during the five-period, and even though the growth both in quantity and percent 
is larger with the group for technical and engineering studies, the numbers for humanities are 
not promising if the choice of these subjects lead a large share of the graduates into 
unemployment. All groups except medicine, which has fallen with approximately 20,000 
students from 1379-1380 to 1383-1384, have increased in number of students for each year, 
and it is only humanities and arts that are having a negative development measured in percent.  
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Table 3.2.1 Students by field of study. Both FIU and state universities. 
 
Subject 1379-1380 1380-1381 1381-1382 1382-1383 1383-1384 
Medicine 143201 131687 131934 137058 132840 
Humanities 765820 753259 777024 864969 964429 
Basic Sciences 164582 165688 181281 209086 232396 
Technical and Engineering 352742 358856 419237 459837 580136 
Agriculture and veterinary 100392 105644 111003 131519 142856 
Arts 46585 51345 53278 89560 64814 
Total 1573322 1566479 1673757 1892029 2117471 
Sources: Statistical Centre of Iran, Statistical Yearbook of the Country, 1379, 1380, 1381, 1382 and 1383. 
Note: These numbers are taken from each specific yearbook. However, the Statistical Centre of Iran has slightly 
changed references to numbers from previous years in the 1383 yearbook. They therefore vary insignificantly 
between the sources.  
 
Table 3.2.2 Students at FIU and state universities by fields of study 
 
Subject 1379-1380 1380-1381 1381-1382 1382-1383 1383-1384 
Medicine 9.1 8.4 7.9 7.2 6.3 
Humanities 48.7 48.1 46.4 45.7 45.5 
Basic Sciences 10.5 10.6 10.8 11.1 11.0 
Technical and Engineering 22.4 22.9 25.0 24.3 27.4 
Agriculture and veterinary 6.4 6.7 6.6 7.0 6.7 
Arts 3.0 3.3 3.2 4.7 3.1 
Total  100 100  100 100 100 
Sources: Statistical Centre of Iran, Statistical Yearbook of the Country, 1379, 1380, 1381, 1382 and 1383. 
Note: These numbers are taken from each specific yearbook. However, the Statistical Centre of Iran has slightly 
changed references to numbers from previous years in the 1383 yearbook. They therefore vary insignificantly 
between the sources. 
 
In interviews conducted for this paper there has been a wide perception among both 
academics and state officials that the FIU to a great extent are to blame for producing the 
wrong skills, and that the quality of many FIU is not what it should be in order to develop the 
human capital needed to reduce unemployment rates. It has previously been shown that the 
quality of the education is most probable to be better in state universities than in FIU because 
of the number of students to each educational staff. This does not automatically mean that the 
FIU is providing more students with “wrong” skills than the state universities, and neither that 
it is sending more students out into unemployment, but studying the rates of subject 
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distribution gives a closer understanding to the situation. Tables 3.2.3 and 3.2.4 show that the 
state universities in the school year 1379-1380 had almost 150,000 students less in humanities 
than FIU, but that during the following five years the gap has narrowed down to 
approximately 30,000. The numbers of humanities students in state universities have 
increased from 312,854 in 1379-1380 to 465,690 in 1383-1384, an increase of 32.2 %, while 
in FIU there has been an increase from 452,966 in 1379-1380 to 498,739 in 1383-1384, which 
comes to an increase of 9.2 %. This shows that the tendency of students choosing subjects that 
are thought not to help the unemployment situation is actually stronger in state universities 
than in FIU. The FIU have during the last years also been leading in educating students within 
technical and engineering subjects and there has been a larger growth in this field in FIU than 
in state universities. In 1379-1380, FIU had a national total of 198,552 students in these 
studies while the state universities had 154,190, a difference of approximately 45,000 
students. This did in the five following years increase to 352,437 students in FIU and 277,699 
in state universities, an increase of 43.7 % and 32.3 % respectively. This development 
suggests that the FIU statistically are closer to undertaking the wanted development toward a 
more technically oriented education than the state universities.  
  
Table 3.2.3 Students at Free Islamic Universities by fields of study 
 
Subject 1379-1380 1380-1381 1381-1382 1382-1383 1383-1384 
Medicine 42375 37840 38902 45264 41528 
Humanities 452966 423575 430479 454177 498739 
Basic Sciences 73304 68593 80786 87577 95473 
Technical and Engineering 198552 203911 236003 255636 352437 
Agriculture and veterinary 52895 56908 57163 73174 80786 
Arts 16157 15802 20857 52378 29528 
Total 836249 806639 864190 968206 1098491 
Source: Statistical Centre of Iran: Statistical Yearbook for Iran 1383 
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Table 3.2.4 Students at state universities by fields of study 
 
Subject 1379-1380 1380-1381 1381-1382 1382-1383 1383-1384 
Medicine 100826 93487 93032 91794 91312 
Humanities 312854 329684 346545 410792 465690 
Basic Sciences 91278 97095 100495 121509 136923 
Technical and Engineering 154190 154945 183234 204291 227699 
Agriculture and veterinary 47947 48736 53840 58345 62070 
Arts 30428 35543 32421 37182 35286 
Total 733527 759870 809567 923913 1018980 
Source: Statistical Centre of Iran: Statistical Yearbook for Iran 1383 
 
 The developments described above should theoretically indicate a slight strengthening 
in diversifying the composition of human capital acquired from education, and thereby 
support Ramcharan’s approach to human capital investment as being more profitable when 
the composition of capital is more important then a high level of education. But in addition to 
there still being a problematically high share of students reading subjects within humanities, 
there is a general problem of keeping a general satisfactory quality level in the education. We 
have seen above that especially the Free Islamic Universities are having problems with a large 
amount of students per educational staff, but there is also a problem of financing and offering 
technical facilities to support the instruction in classes. This problem is especially evident in 
Free Islamic Universities, and to exemplify the present situation the branch in Zanjan will be 
considered. The branch is considered one of the better because it was recently established, it 
lies in a province that has had relatively good economical development, and the teaching staff 
has generally good qualifications50. The university gives an impression of being of good 
quality from the outside with a large well-held compound and large building complexes. On 
the inside however most classrooms are only provided with plastic chairs and a board, 
otherwise the rooms are empty51. This means that everyone that are reading subjects like 
information technology, computer science, and other technical subjects that require computers 
and instruments in the learning process are left without such offers. There is a small room 
with computers, but since this is supposed to be shared by a large amount of students there is 
only a few that can use the facilities. In a subject such as IT engineering none of the classes 
include the use of computers, and the fewest of the students can afford buying their own so 
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that the education is restricted to studying books and delivering projects written either by 
hand or by waiting in line at the computer room52.  
 Mohammad Zarifi at the Ministry of Labour describes this as a general problem with 
Free Islamic Universities throughout the country. He says that in the last years it has become 
an easy way of gaining popularity for province governors or other politicians running for 
election to promise erection of new universities. In most of the cases the universities are built, 
but since the financial means do not allow for much more than the establishment of a building 
with empty classrooms the education is in most cases restricted to subjects where technical 
equipment is not needed, such as humanities and arts, or the classes in technical and science 
subjects have to manage with a marginal access to such facilities as computers, science 
equipment, and laboratories53. 
 
3.3 Education level and the impact on unemployment 
 
Salehi-Isfahani (2005) argues that there are three distinctive features of youth unemployment 
in Iran: “it is very severe among the educated, has persisted despite five years of rising GDP, 
and entails a longer waiting time than general unemployment”54. The level of education 
recognised with unemployment can be of importance when searching to identify causes to the 
problem and to see how these can be approached. When a distinct feature of youth 
unemployment is that it is especially severe among those with tertiary education, this further 
emphasises the problem of mismatching skill production in the universities as a structural 
problem for urban youth employment.  
When considering the rate of unemployment in labour force with tertiary education it 
is not sensationally high compared to the national total rate. Actually, where the national total 
rate in 1380 was 14.8 %, the rate of unemployment among those with tertiary education was 
10.1 %, accordingly 4.7 % lower than the total rate. The rate for the latter did increase to 16.9 
% in 1383, but then fell down to 13.3 % in 1384. Compared to the total unemployment rate 
among youth, which decreased from 34.2 % in 1380 to 25.2 % in 1384, the rate of those with 
higher education is far lower. There are some provinces that are having bigger continuous 
troubles in offering jobs to the highly educated than the others, such as Mazandaran, Gilan, 
and especially Tehran, but these are more of exceptions than representable references to this 
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group of unemployed. On the other hand there are some provinces that are showing 
remarkably low unemployment rates among the higher educated, such as Sistan & 
Baluchestan which has had a development from 1.8 % in 1380 to 2.7 % in 1384, and 
Hormozegan with 3.6 % in 1380 and 2.9 % in 1384. As with the three provinces with high 
rates referred to previously, Sistan & Baluchestan and Hormuzegan are rather exceptions than 
representable for the whole group, but they show that it is difficult to generalise youth 
unemployment in Iran to being a distinct higher education problem. Thus, even though the 
unemployment rates for youth with higher education according to international standards 
nationally still are alarmingly high, constitute a difficult problem for university graduates, and 
a challenge for the government, they are not an especially distinct feature of youth 
unemployment in Iran.  
 Instead, there is another faction of the population that is showing much more worrying 
numbers among the young. When all students graduate from high school they have the offer 
of continuing into a one-year pre-university school whose sole purpose is to prepare them for 
the university concours. Although most high school graduates add this year to their studies, 
either in the free public schools or private schools that charge for the course, the majority of 
these are not accepted to universities even though the pre-university exam is passed. Some 
continue reading in hope of being accepted when the universities accept new students, but 
since the universities still have an admittance restriction of between ten and twenty percent of 
the applicants many are forced to seek work instead of entering tertiary education. The youth 
that have a high school or pre-university school diploma are facing a hard time in both being 
admitted to universities and getting a job if not being enrolled into higher education, and 
statistically it is this group that creates a distinct feature of youth unemployment. Since rural 
youth unemployment is largely a problem affecting the illiterate and semi-literate population, 
the unemployed with high school and pre-university school diplomas are more importantly a 
distinct feature of urban youth unemployment. As can be observed in table 3.3.1, in 1380 the 
province with the lowest unemployment rate in this group was Sistan & Baluchestan with 
20.4 %, while Kerman and Golestan were sharing the position as worst affected with 44.3 %. 
The total for the whole country in the same year was 30.1 %. In the years toward 1384 the 
total rate for this group increased dramatically to 36.1 %, an opposite development to the 
national total rate that fell to 11.0 %. In 1384 Sistan & Baluchestan was still the province with 
the lowest rate, figuring at 17.8 %, while Kerman kept its position at the top of the statistics, 
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but with a significant increase to 55.5 %, closely followed by Kohgiluye & Boyerahmad with 
54.5 % and Ilam with 53.7 %.  
 
Table 3.3.1 Unemployed youth55 with tertiary education (T.E.) and with high school diploma or pre-
university school (D/PU) (%), 1380-1384. 
 
Province 1380 1381 1382 1383 1384 
 T.E. D/PU T.E. D/PU T.E. D/PU T.E. D/PU T.E. D/PU 
East 
Azerbaijan 
12.2 35.6 18.3 35.1 20.5 37.5 32.2 36.6 15.3 34.9 
West 
Azerbaijan 
8.3 25.0 9.3 28.2 15.1 34.0 14.0 31.1 17.9 26.7 
Ardabil 13.0 32.1 14.8 43.8 24.9 40.2 22.4 29.1 16.3 44.4 
Esfahan 15.4 30.6 16.3 30.5 18.4 31.3 14.6 35.9 14.6 32.2 
Ilam 10.3 44.0 13.5 45.3 13.4 55.8 24.0 42.5 17.6 53.7 
Bushehr 10.0 33.3 8.9 33.3 10.1 32.4 10.7 33.6 7.5 37.0 
Tehran 26.1 35.9 28.2 34.5 24.9 43.3 27.5 39.6 16.0 34.7 
Chaharmahal 
& Bakhtiari 
8.0 23.5 24.9 26.4 27.7 32.4 15.6 23.8 25.7 28.6 
Khorasan 7.9 24.1 12.4 31.5 14.4 36.3 15.6 28.7 9.9 26.7 
Khuzestan 8.4 32.1 6.8 32.5 8.8 41.6 10.0 32.9 8.9 30.3 
Zanjan 8.7 34.9 14.0 37.0 13.7 45.6 14.6 45.4 17.6 41.0 
Semnan 10.2 31.2 15.7 43.9 19.2 43.3 20.3 33.4 16.5 43.7 
Sistan & 
Baluchestan 
1.8 20.4 2.7 22.4 3.0 14.8 4.3 27.8 2.7 17.8 
Fars 8.1 24.6 11.8 33.8 15.9 29.9 16.2 32.2 17.7 36.7 
Qazvin 7.3 28.8 12.9 34.3 20.9 33.4 12.0 34.2 16.1 31.7 
Qom 6.7 25.8 6.1 21.3 11.1 22.8 14.3 27.5 10.3 28.1 
Kordestan 3.6 22.4 7.7 31.8 7.4 37.5 11.1 28.3 7.3 31.9 
Kerman 13.7 44.3 12.7 45.1 10.5 45.1 22.8 49.2 11.4 55.5 
Kermanshah 7.7 25.9 7.9 38.2 12.0 27.1 15.7 34.2 13.2 34.8 
Kohgiluye & 
Boyerahmad 
12.5 42.5 10.5 45.7 14.8 54.0 16.1 47.1 11.9 54.5 
Golestan 11.1 44.3 14.1 31.9 12.2 38.3 15.6 29.7 9.8 32.0 
Gilan 10.7 35.3 17.2 41.2 21.2 38.0 26.8 39.2 17.3 41.6 
Lorestan 9.5 38.5 13.5 32.5 11.5 43.3 12.2 44.9 7.7 34.9 
Mazandaran 22.3 40.1 30.3 39.4 31.4 38.8 29.7 47.3 26.3 41.3 
Markazi 7.8 35.2 13.1 37.9 14.5 32.4 14.7 31.6 11.5 38.6 
Hormozegan 3.6 27.4 3.7 24.0 3.6 28.5 9.7 25.3 2.9 30.4 
Hamedan 5.5 24.1 15.2 33.2 11.5 35.4 12.7 29.9 11.2 33.6 
Yazd 9.8 29.9 10.8 33.9 13.4 29.5 17.7 40.6 12.2 32.7 
Total Iran 10,1 30.1 12.9 34.6 15.2 36.5 16.9 35.1 13.3 36.1 
Sources: Statistical Centre of Iran: Statistical Collection of the Employment and Unemployment Conditions of 
Households, Bahman 1380, Mordad 1381, Mordad 1382, spring 1383, Ordibehesht 1384. 
 
 The previous shows that the problem of urban youth unemployment does not only 
concern the part of the population with tertiary education, but is also strongly present among 
those who possess a diploma from secondary schooling. Both the quality of secondary 
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education and the process of admittance to universities are important factors in sustaining 
unemployment in the latter category. But what is maybe more important is how human capital 
should be composed in order to create economical development, as introduced by Ramcharan 
(2004). Ramcharan argues that, while the highly educated, such as scientist and technicians, 
appear to have an advance in understanding and adapting new or existing ideas into a 
production process, some minimum level of education is also required to successfully execute 
the production steps56. Thus, in Ramcharan’s view, successful economical growth depends on 
not everyone succeeding or being interested in attending higher education because the 
economy needs labour force to execute the plans for development created by the highly 
educated. Every society has active labour force that do not possess diplomas from higher 
education, but a problem in Iran is that this part of the population is very large and because of 
the lack of economical development at the present time, over one third of youth with high 
school or pre-university diplomas are struggling to find jobs. This economical development 
will most probably not come as an initiative from the holders of high school or pre-university 
diplomas, but will be depending on the quality and developments in higher education, and, as 
we will see later, on the opportunities to invest and develop this human capital in private 
sector. Ramcharan’s view on human capital composition as an important factor to growth 
lacks further definitions on how such a composition should be balanced, and how large the 
part of tertiary educated should be to the secondary educated. In many western countries the 
development of what is often referred to as “knowledge based economy”, where the focus is 
less on industrial production and more on the administration and production of data and 
information, has become dominant in the economy. How this has an effect on the composition 
of the employed labour force can be demonstrated by looking at the OECD countries, where 
there has been a continued growth during the last ten years, and where the composition has 
been from 28 % of the employees being employed in the industrial sector and 63 % in the 
service sector in 1995, to 25 % in industrial sector and 69 % in the service sector ten years 
after57. This indicates that the development and implementation of human capital in growing 
economies has become more important than the labour force’s participation in industry and 
manufacture, and that this development has contributed to further growth in the economies. 
There are differences between the economies of the OECD countries and Iran, but in an 
attempt to develop small and medium enterprises in private sector that to a large degree is 
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knowledge based, investment in human capital on a higher educational level is important in 
order to obtain results. 
 
3.4 The challenge of directing human capital toward private sector 
 
Structural unemployment has in the previous been referred to as a lack or mismatch of skills 
presented to the labour market. In this section an additional interpretation of structural 
unemployment is presented in order to explain to what degree youth with tertiary education 
are attracted to investing their skills in private sector. This unemployment originates in labour 
force barriers to take certain jobs because the job does not fit certain requirements that the 
worker may have. This usually takes form as geographical barriers, such as if there is a vacant 
position as an engineer in one city but the applicant is living in another city and chooses not to 
take the job because of either the distance in travelling or because he or she is not willing to 
move to another city in order to get the job. An example to such geographical barriers to 
employment was seen during the research for this paper, as this author had a conversation 
with a graduate student in accounting that had been offered a job in the southern part of 
Tehran, but did not accept it because the applicant lived in the northern part of the city and the 
travel distance in the enormous city would be to far for the job to be interesting enough58. The 
perception of a job as not fitting personal requirements also has a form where the requirement 
is caused by socially affected barriers rather than geographical (although geographical barriers 
also can be caused by social factors). Thus the person who is searching for a job is selective in 
choosing employment as a result of socially formed personal connotations with the job that is 
available. Mohammad Zarifi at the Ministry of Labour, and Jaafar Satvaty at the National 
Youth Organisation both argue that there is a general attitude among Iranians, and especially 
among the young, that causes a preference for employment in public sector instead of private 
sector59. As a consequence, this attitude makes it difficult to attract human capital to private 
sector, and as a result of this, to develop the economy in a direction that creates employment.  
Although the percent of active labour force employed in private sector in Ordibehesht 
1383 was 75.8 % compared to 24.0 % in public sector (the remaining 0.2 % being employed 
in cooperatives), public sector is today by far the largest employer of workers with higher 
education in Iran. In 1380 64 % of men and 84 % of women with tertiary education were 
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employed within public sector60. While the total number of state employees decreased 
marginally with 0,6 % over the period from 1378 to 1383, there has been a 17,3 % increase in 
employees with diplomas from higher education. At the same time there has been a 17,7 % 
decrease in employees without higher education, something that has resulted in more 
employees of public sector having higher education than not.   
 
Table 3.4.1 Employees in public sector by education 
 
Year Total Higher education No higher education 
1378 2256625 987489 1265136 
1380 2328655 1123166 1205489 
1382 2285264 1112962 1172302 
1383 2269735 1194462 1075273 
Source: Statistical Centre of Iran: Statistical Yearbook for Iran 1383. Author’s calculations. 
 
According to Zarifi and Satvaty the most important motive for educated youth to 
search employment in state institutions is that it provides job security, especially for male 
workers who in order to be able to support a wife, and sooner or later a family, are in need of 
having economic security. The argument of Zarifi and Satvaty can be supported by that there 
are certain features of state employment that are profitable for the employee61. If an applicant 
gets through the employment process for a state job there are microscopic chances for one to 
lose one’s job and there applies a fixed minimum wage that is regulated after which 
educational diploma the worker has obtained. The Civil Service Employment Code, which 
restricts a manager’s ability to determine the pay and layoff, regulates public sector 
employment in Iran, and it places a high premium on formal schooling instead of the 
manager’s personal evaluation of the employee in pay determination62. It also applies to the 
benefit of public sector that the average annual wages are almost exclusively higher in public 
sector than in private on all levels of education63. There has been a steady increase in public 
sector wages from the mid 1990s, something that is important for the rising attractiveness of 
state employment as a whole. To the economical benefits are also added bonus arrangements, 
and the Labour Law states that “all employers in enterprises included in the labour law are 
bound to pay each of its employees in the proportion of one year [i.e. those who have been 
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employed for at least one year] of work equivalent to the sixty latest days of wage as holiday 
bonus or reward.”, and for workers that have worked less than one year it adds that “the sum 
of payment to workers who have worked less than one year in the enterprise must be 
calculated on the basis of sixty days of paid work and in proportion of the time worked in the 
year. The sum of payment must on this account for each month not exceed one twelfth of the 
decided ceiling in the single article [i.e. the article cited above] of this law.”64 This bonus is 
received at occasions like the Prophet Mohammad’s birthday and the New Year’s holiday 
(‘eid-e nouruz). This law is regulative for both public and private sector since the Labour Law 
includes “all employers, employees of enterprises, [and] producing, industrial, service, and 
agriculture establishments are by nature bound to this law”65, but since there are fixed wages 
in public sector the bonuses are easier to calculate, more secure, and close to fixed when 
getting the job.  
 Zarifi argues that a more abstract and non-measurable feature with public sector is the 
widespread opinion that a position in a state institution brings more executive power than a 
private sector worker has, and also that state employees are more trustable than those 
employed in private sector66. The latter is a result of the variety of introducing tests that an 
applicant to a state position has to go through in order to be accepted for a job, such as health 
tests and checks on drug abuse and alcoholism, all which give state employees a status as 
reliable persons. As an anecdote to the general trust to state employees, Zarifi says that it is 
for example much easier to buy on the tick if you can show that you are a state employee than 
if you are employed in private sector, where there are no standardised security checks as in 
public sector67. Two additional factors contribute to the preference of employment in public 
sector. The first is the apprehension that when you first are employed in public sector, 
because the possibility of loosing your job is minimal, the job itself and amount of work will 
be “comfortable” (kar-e rahati). The second is that the work not will be too challenging68. 
These two are closely connected to both the problem of a large and bureaucratic public sector, 
and the Labour Law’s restrictions on removing employees from their jobs.   
 If youth with tertiary education generally prefer state employment instead of 
employment in private sector this is an important problem that causes two developments that 
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are not favourable for the development of human capital investment in private sector. The 
first is that the pressure on public sector to create more jobs for university graduates increases. 
Public sector such as it exists today is in most segments strongly overmanned, resulting in 
inefficiency and a heavy and expensive bureaucracy. For entrepreneurs searching to establish 
private companies this becomes a marathon of patience and frustration because it has to go 
through a demanding registration and licence process with state institutions. Since Ali Akbar 
Hashemi Rafsanjani became president in 1989 all governments have tried to expand private 
sector through the privatisation of public sector assets, and thereby also to reduce the state 
labour force69. This has neither had much effect on the economy or the manpower situation. 
As earlier indicated, at the same time as the total number of state employees has been 
decreasing slightly since 1378, and thereby giving an impression of a positive development in 
reducing the number of employees in public sector, the rate of people with higher education in 
public sector has actually increased. The second problem is that with this increase, human 
capital needed for entrepreneurship and economical growth in private sector is being 
channelled and tied up to public sector, and as long as human capital stays within a general 
conception of public sector as the preferred secure employer, human capital investment in 
private sector will remain limited. 
 As a supplementary to the arguments of Zarifi and Satvaty this author provided a 
multiple-choice survey with students at the Free Islamic University of Zanjan. Today’s 
students are those who will enter the labour market in few years, and even though this survey 
cannot be representable for nationwide opinions, it assists in providing a more comprehensive 
view to the arguments above70. The survey was conducted with ten students reading technical 
and engineering studies at bachelor (BA) level with a general age of 21.2 years, where the 
lowest age was 19 and the highest 26 years, and with a median age of 21 years. 50 % of the 
participants were women and 50 % were men, and none of the participants were married at 
the time of the survey.  
 Concerning the first of the previous arguments, where it is suggested that Iranians are 
seeking towards employment in public sector because of job security, the survey gives an 
interesting result. The participants were asked what is more important in the event of 
accepting a job, job security, personal satisfaction with the job, or a good salary. While two 
chose good salary, the same number chose job security as more important. The rest, 7 
participants (one of these marked at both good salary and personal satisfaction), chose 
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personal satisfaction as more important when accepting a job. This result is quite opposite of 
what was argued by Zarifi and Satvaty, and what is maybe quite as interesting is that the two 
choosing job security as more important were women. This means that none of the men 
included in the survey saw job security as more important than personal satisfaction with the 
job or good salary, something that does not coincide with the argument of wishing to secure a 
steady income in order to for example support a marriage and a future family. As a more 
general question, the students were asked, if they could choose, would they rather be 
employed in public or private sector. A similar result as in the first question was experienced, 
where seven of the asked students answered that they would prefer to be employed in private 
sector, as opposite to three who were more attracted to public sector. Of the latter two were 
women, something that also resembles the result from the first question, where those who 
were more concerned with job security were women. Not coinciding with prior expectations 
is that the two choosing job security as more important when accepting a job would rather be 
working for private sector than public sector, and the ones that preferred to work for public 
sector chose personal satisfaction with their future job as more important than job security.  
 Moving on to the question of yearly bonuses, the students were asked whether the sum 
of such bonuses are important for their choice of employer or not. In this case there was only 
two answering that this was not important, while eight found it important. Furthermore, six of 
the participants felt private sector to be a better alternative when concerning the yearly 
bonuses, while four expected public sector to give better bonuses. According to the Labour 
Law there should be no fundamental differences in yearly bonuses between public and private 
sector, or at least these differences should follow regulations in wage and not the nature of 
sector. Thus, even though the results were quite even in the latter question, this could be taken 
as a sign that there is a perception of private sector economically being a good alternative to 
public sector, and that acceptable bonuses are not something that is exclusively associated 
with public sector.  
 The students were also confronted with what I previously have referred to as the more 
abstract comprehensions of power and trust connected to employees in the two sectors. 
Initially they were asked if the power a job gives is important, whereof six saw this as 
important, one as not important, and three left the question unanswered. Thereafter, the 
participants were asked to specify whether public or private sector gives more power, or if 
none of them give particularly more power than the other. Four of the students replied that 
public sector employment gives more power, five chose private sector, and one was of the 
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conviction that none of them would give more power. Thereafter the students were asked 
whether they have more trust in a public or private sector employee, as of which four 
answered private and four public, and two saw neither private or public sector to provide 
more trustworthiness. These results are most remarkable in the way that they do not single out 
any of the sectors as providing whether more power or trustworthiness. As in the previous 
results, this differs from the assertions of Zarifi and Satvaty, where the arguments were a 
generally stronger association of trustworthiness and power with public employees than 
private. This survey indicates that there is a preference for private sector on all areas, even 
though this might not always be in strong favour of public sector. The last multiple choice 
question of the survey is maybe the most promising for future development. In this the 
participants were asked if they are not employed anywhere after their studies are finished, 
would they consider establishing a private company? As a respond to this seven answered that 
this would be an alternative, three did not know, while none excluded the idea for the benefit 
of continuing the search for employment.  
 There are many variables that have to be taken into considerations both in the 
interviews with Zarifi and Satvaty, and in the survey done at the Free Islamic University of 
Zanjan. The former do not have primary research or surveys to refer to, but their opinions are 
based upon experiences from work in institutions concerned with employment, labour, and 
youth. The student survey done by this author has its weaknesses in the low quantity of 
participants, and it is possible that had someone else – for example from another subject, 
another university, state or Free Islamic, and on another degree level been subjected to the 
same questions, the results would have looked different. However, even though none of the 
sources can be considered to exclude or confirm the other, both are valuable insights into 
social barriers or possibilities toward the labour market.  
 Zarifi and Satvaty present a general positive view among Iranians on employment in 
public sector, and are thereby outlining a situation that makes directing human capital toward 
private sector difficult. What the survey this author has conducted shows is a more 
multifaceted view, provided by students at the Free Islamic University of Zanjan, that is much 
more positive towards private sector than presented by Zarifi and Satvaty.  
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4.0 LABOUR MARKET RIGIDITIES HUMAN CAPITAL INVESTMENT IN 
PRIVATE SECTOR 
 
The argument of this chapter is that classical unemployment is enduring among youth in Iran 
because there exist certain rigidities imposed upon the labour market, understood here as legal 
regulations, which cause low interest in and possibilities for human capital investment in 
private sector. As a result of this, the development of new firms and the expansion of existing 
companies remain at a low pace and the demand for labour force is sustained at a low level. 
Sevilir (2007) argues that investment in human capital in already established firms will over 
time both provide the mother company with new innovations, and it will create entrepreneurs 
that eventually will develop non-firm specific innovations that lead to the establishment of 
new firms, independent from the parental company (see chapter 2). However, because the risk 
of loosing valuable employees to entrepreneurship in the initial phase is considerable, such 
investment is considered very expensive, and it demands that the firm is economically capable 
of running an investment project over some time in order to gain from the project.  
In Iran the size of private sector is considerable, and especially small and medium 
private enterprises, so-called SMEs, have a strong potential in becoming a major source of 
employment generation and diversification of the economy. In fact, an overwhelming 
majority of private business in Iran today belongs to such firms. In 2004 there were about 
345,000 officially registered small industries, excluding the trade and service sectors, of 
which a large majority are small or micro enterprises with 10 or less workers71. Most trade 
and service enterprises, as well as micro level workshops, are registered under various guilds 
of the Ministry of Commerce. The registered firms count somewhere between 400,000 and 
500,000, and trade businesses dominate the guilds. The service sector has a weaker 
representation, but is by the ILO seen as having a great deal of employment potential72. The 
share of medium enterprises (50-99 employees) is very small in comparison to the small and 
micro-scale firms, something that is part of the reason why Iranian private sector has 
remained peripheral to the total economy, and also has had a modest effect on large scale 
employment.  
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4.1 State efforts to encourage private sector investment 
 
The Iranian governments have during the last years recognised the importance of a 
strong development of growth in small private enterprises, something that can be traced and 
recognised in the country’s development plans. Iran’s Third Economic Plan (1999-2004) aims 
at supporting promotion of self-employment and entrepreneurial activities, particularly among 
women, and the Fourth Five Year Development Plan (2005-2009) emphasises a further 
development of the private sector by a continued transfer, liquidation, and merging of public 
corporations73. The government has repeatedly encouraged investment in the private sector in 
order to diversify the economy and to cause an increase in employment. In order to increase 
private investment the government has also implemented economical support mechanisms. 
The Budget Law of 1385 approves a state monetary policy where the state is bound to pay a 
certain amount to the banking system in order to “support investments done by private and 
cooperative sectors for job creating projects”74. There is also allowed an increase up to IR 1.8 
trillion in the outstanding of directed banking facilities in the same year, where the share of 
the public sector shall be 25 % and cooperative and private sector 75 %, and where a 
minimum of 65 % of the cooperative and private sector’s share is bound to be distributed 
among provinces in order to extend job creation in less developed regions75. There are several 
ministries engaged in promoting investment in SMEs. The Ministry of Industry and Mines in 
2002 set up a scheme where it provides a loan of up till IR 55 million without collateral for 
each new worker employed, of which it claimed to have generated 26,000 new jobs in 10 
months76. Likewise, the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare in 1380 started a support 
initiative where entrepreneurs can apply for IR 30 million loans for each recruited worker at a 
subsidised 6 percent interest rate77. The Management and Planning Organisation (MPO) also 
has wanted to help funding the establishment of small enterprises by offering a loan of up till 
IR 30 million to educated youth who intend to start their own business78.  
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4.2 Rigidities imposed upon the labour market 
In Iran, all legal regulations on the economy and the labour market are introduced from state 
level instead from an interaction between the state and independent labour organisations. As a 
result of this, although there exist a variety of labor unions, private sector does not have any 
real influence on decisions concerning legal regulations, and the conditions of enterprise 
establishment and management are entirely controlled by state organs. Because some 
rigidities placed upon the labour market particularly affect private actors in the economy, this 
has created hardship in developing a sector that dares to investment in human capital, and by 
this also a sector that is not able to take advantage of the existing human resources. Iranian 
public sector is subject to relatively the same regulations as private sector, but since the state 
is actually trying to decrease its total number of employees it is not this sector that is in dire 
need of reforms to increase growth and employment capacity. Thus, those who are 
experiencing hardship when being subjected to these rigidities are mainly micro (1-5 
employees), small (6-10 employees and 10-49 employees) and medium (50-99 employees) 
enterprises in private sector, where the economical balance is most vulnerable. 
All workers in private sector fall under the Labour Law of 1990, a law that in 
comparison to the prior law of 1956 has increased job security and is more rigorously 
enforced79. The law’s attempt to legislate job security has also become its most difficult 
problem. The right of having a job and not being subject to loosing it has been a feature of the 
Islamic Republic’s ideology since the revolution, and Article 46 of the constitution states that 
“…no person can because of ownership regarding his own business and labour deprive 
another person his possibility to business and labour”80. This article is mirrored in the Labour 
Law, which does not recognise poor performance as ground for dismissal, and after the one-
month test-period for unskilled workers, and three-month period for skilled workers, makes it 
close to impossible to fire an employee. A dismissal permit on the ground of unsatisfying 
performance can be obtained through applying to a government-appointed labour council81. 
This council consists of three members representing employers, employees, and the Ministry 
of Labour. If the complaint is found justifiable the employer can be subjected to fines and also 
to reinstate the worker. The employer is in case of final dismissal of the worker enforced to 
pay a severance pay to the dismissed that equals to one month’s wage for each year of 
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employment82. This opportunity for the worker causes economical hardship both if it is ruled 
against and for the employer, and an even bigger problem is that it always creates an 
uncertainty of the economical costs in advance of a dismissal. The Labour Law also sets a 
minimum wage that is according to the schooling of the employee, but it does not specify an 
upper limit83. Thus, if an enterprise is looking for other qualities than the education of the 
employee, such as creativity, effectivity, and teamwork, it will face a dilemma when hiring 
new work force. The minimum wage prevents educated workers to offer their labour at a 
lower wage to demonstrate their less observable skills. The potentially high cost of dismissing 
an employee also makes the employers weary of taking the risk of hiring someone, because if 
someone is employed at one wage level, this person could later reveal to have a higher degree 
and therefore ask for an increase in wage.  
Of the most progressive achievements with the law are the employers’ economical 
responsibilities to their employees. Women are entitled to up to ninety days of paid maternity 
leave (Article 76), and stipulates that until the child of a woman is three two years old, the 
woman is entitled to half an hour of feeding break every three hours, and the employer is 
bound to facilitate a place for the children to be taken care of while the mother is working 
(Article 78)84. The law also requires major employers to provide workers such welfare offers 
as housing, sport facilities, and training85. In addition to the Labour Law, Iran has a provision 
for a very comprehensive social security system based mainly on payroll levy financing, and 
it intends for it to pay support for retirement, disability, healthcare, and some unemployment 
redundancy protection. One of the plans, the Unemployment Insurance Act, was implemented 
in 1990, after three years of testing. This Act has because of its way of collecting revenues 
become an issue in the discussion on private sector’s possibilities and willingness to employ 
new labour force. Depending on the durability of employment and membership in the 
insurance fund, the unemployed receives 55 % of the average salary paid out during the last 
year of service, and the employee is entitled to support for a half to four years86. In many 
countries the source of unemployment insurance is a shared initiative between the employer, 
the worker, and the state. Iran is one of several countries that differ from this with the whole 
responsibility being left on the shoulders of the employer. As long as the enterprise is a 
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registered member of the Social Security Organisation (SSO) the employer has to pay a fixed 
rate of 3 % of the wage fund. The worker and the state have no role in supplying the revenues 
of the unemployment fund87. In 1380 6,374,568 persons and their families were covered by 
the SSO, comprising altogether almost 40 % of the total population88. A variety of other 
social organisations exist, but these all draw their revenues from other sources than the 
employer, and in most cases from other sources than the employee as well. The increase in 
wages during the last years has made it harder for firms to be able to pay the fee, something 
that has led to many private workshops not reporting the correct wages paid and putting down 
minimum possible figures by making an agreement between the employer and the 
employee89.  
The legal regulations in the Labour Law concern all established private companies, 
but there are also challenges that face entrepreneurs that wish to invest in a new firm. The 
total expenses of creating a job in micro or small manufacturing firms is estimated to be 
approximately IR 150 million90, a sum which consists mostly of the compliance costs, such as 
taxes, registration fees, cost of establishment, industrial certificates, import duties, and 
municipality charges. The enterprise will also be faced with a myriad of legislations, both 
when starting up the business and when hiring new workers91. Eventually, in order to be 
legally permitted to establish an enterprise there has to be obtained certain certificates, 
registrations, and licences, who at the present time are being issued by dividing the work 
between four different ministries.  
 
4.3 What effect do state initiatives and rigidities have on human capital investment? 
 
For already established companies the rigidities imposed through the Labour Law and in 
social security systems are a problem for both employing labour force, and for being able to 
invest in human capital. The Labour Law’s provision to provide workers with job security, 
and its transfer of the economical burden of welfare from the employee to the employer 
increases labour costs significantly and discourages employment92. Also, if a company was to 
implement all the demands of the Labour Law’s welfare arrangements, the real wage would in 
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most cases rise to well above full employment level, and it would both deter investors and 
restrict own material and human capital investments.  
 As a cause of the difficulties of investing in human capital in established firms, the 
development of entrepreneurs that will leave the mother company in order to establish a new 
firm will remain restricted. The state initiatives referred to above are positive in the way that 
they show that there is interest in supporting private sector development, and the ministries 
are referring to a certain degree of success with the programs. But the sums of the loans are 
not enough even to start a micro size enterprise, the loaning criteria are not uniform for all 
firms, collateral requirements are difficult to meet, and the interest rates of the loans offered 
are usually high, altogether causing demands for good results from the very beginning of 
business. The problems meet new firms already before the business is up and running with a 
heavy process of obtaining licenses, certificates, and registrations through the bureaucracy of 
four ministries. After having been able to employ more than five employees the demands of 
the Labour Law also becomes a large challenge in order to balance the economy.  
 What should invite to a certain degree of interest in establishing at least micro size 
enterprises, is that firms with less than six employees are altogether exempt from the Labour 
Law, and therefore also not subjected to the welfare and job security measures that are taken 
in the law93. Also, firms with 10 employees or less are permitted to dismiss workers much 
more freely than those with 11 or more, so that it is the small establishments of 11 to 49 
employees, and the medium establishments of 50-99 employees that are regulated by the 
Labour Law94. However, the largest part of highly educated in private sector is employed in 
firms with 11 employees or more. Thus barriers to investment in and development of human 
capital are affecting those firms that have the capability strongest. Sevilir (2007) argued that 
human capital investment in already established firms would lead to increased innovativity 
and improved results for the company, but also that it would create a by-effect of 
entrepreneurship, where some of the individuals that had been invested in would leave the 
mother company in order to establish new firms, so called spin-outs, based on the knowledge 
and inspiration from the parental firm. As a result of the rigidities placed upon the labour 
market as presented above, the real wage exceeds full employment level at a point where the 
firm is in need of product and staff supply, such activity becomes difficult to execute in Iran. 
Those firms that are already established, and should theoretically be able to initiate human 
capital investments, are facing economical hardship and insecurity when employing new 
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labour force. These difficulties are making it a large risk to invest in human capital, 
something that is expected to be very expensive in the initial phase and then to bring 
profitable results after some time. Iranian companies can under such circumstances either be 
successful through a very careful calculation of expenditures, or the firm could risk 
bankruptcy because of expensive legal trials, such as in the case of firing an employee. The 
effect of this uncertainty is that entrepreneurs are not created through human capital 
investment, and spin-outs, that in other countries are showing to have an important role in the 
economy, do not have the possibility of being established or to take advantage of a large 
knowledge base such as spin-outs in other countries. Consequently, when investment in 
human capital is to such a degree restricted it results in making economical development in 
private sector difficult, and employment possibilities remain limited.  
 From these difficulties and obstacles connected to management of established 
companies and entrepreneurship it would be assumed that the interest for human capital 
investment in private sector is very low. What is somewhat a contradictory view to this 
assumption are the results from the student survey presented in chapter 3. A majority of the 
participants generally preferred private sector as their future employers, and also had good 
connotations with private sector employment. A majority was also considering establishing 
their own company if they could not be employed somewhere directly after their studies have 
ended. An important feature with the survey is that all of the participants were students of 
engineering and technological subjects, and that students within these subjects, which are both 
by the government and economists considered important in the countries economical growth, 
are generally positive to private sector employment and entrepreneurship. 
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5.0 CONCLUSION 
 
This paper has been a research on the main causes of sustained high urban youth 
unemployment in Iran. It has considered the phenomenon based on structural and classical 
explanations to unemployment, and through empirical findings obtained through statistical 
sources in English and Persian, and interviews with economists, academics, state employees, 
and university students, considered whether the argument that the high unemployment rate 
among urban youth in Iran is based in human capital development deficiencies can be 
verified. There have been used two approaches to human capital development and human 
capital investment in order to create a theoretical framework for the empirical research. The 
first is Rodney Ramcharan’s view on human capital development and investment in 
education, where especially tertiary education has been emphasised in this study. The second 
is Merih Sevilir’s approach considering human capital development and investment in 
established firms. Both of these argue that investment in human capital development is crucial 
to sustained economical growth.  
 Deficiency in higher education is generally one of the key factors that are used for 
explaining the unemployment problem in Iran. All the literary sources for this paper are 
arguing that the education system produces a labour force with skills that are not matching the 
labour market’s demands, thereby sustaining structural unemployment. In interviews with 
employees in the National Youth Organisation and the Ministry of Labour a common 
argument was presented, considering it a general attitude among Iranians, especially youth, 
that they prefer employment in public sector before private sector in a concern for job security 
and because of more positive connotations with state employment. This study has indicated 
that the arguments of the literary sources to a large extent are verifiable, especially through 
statistical sources. The universities are having problems with facilitating the constantly 
increasing number of applicants to higher education, and the acceptance of applicants is low 
compared to the total number who tries to get into tertiary education each year. Those who are 
accepted have passed the much discussed test for higher education that does not consider 
earlier education, and even though skills are needed for the tests, who gets accepted into 
universities is more a random choice than based in the student’s knowledge. As one student 
expressed in a conversation: “it is much more important to know on which date Khomeini 
was born than knowing anything about your studies”.  
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 In this study education quality has been considered on the basis of the literary sources’ 
argument that this is not satisfying in today’s education system. This paper has found that 
comparing the Free Islamic Universities and state universities, it shows that the former is 
provided with far less educational staff than the latter, thus indicating that education in Free 
Islamic Universities theoretically is not as good in state universities. However, it has also 
been shown that both university categories have had positive developments during the period 
studied. Further comparing Free Islamic Universities and state universities, the developments 
in certain subjects assumed to be producing mismatching skills in the labour market has been 
considered. This paper has shown that students reading subjects that are considered not to 
contribute to employment, such as humanities and arts, are increasing in numbers, but that 
these subjects’ total shares compared to other studies are slowly decreasing. It also shows that 
the Free Islamic Universities are having the most positive developments within students’ 
choice of subject, where the share reading humanities is slowly decreasing, at the same time 
as students reading engineering and technical subjects are growing steeply in numbers. The 
state universities are having a positive development as well, but with a much slower pace, and 
with an increase in humanities students that is much steeper than in the Free Islamic 
Universities.  
 As a counterweight to the arguments put forth in the previously mentioned interviews, 
this author conducted a survey among a group of university students. As opposite to the 
supposed general view of public sector as a more attractive employer than private sector, the 
participants through a variety of questions indicated that private sector is actually more 
preferred than public sector. Both the survey and the interviews have certain weaknesses and 
strengths, but what this survey could conclude was that state employment is not so 
exclusively preferred, and that the view of private sector employment is more positively 
viewed than assumed.  
 These empirical findings on employment suggest that there still exist severe obstacles 
to a development in human capital that can be complimentary to the labour market, and that 
the inequalities in education quality are leaving a high number of students with an 
unsatisfying education background. However, what is new with this study is its indications 
that developments during the years considered, and the results obtained in this paper, are 
generally more positive than in other studies and in interviews conducted for this thesis.  
 This study has also searched to see whether legal rigidities imposed by the state are 
having an effect on the interest and possibilities for private establishments to invest in human 
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capital development. This paper has shown that, even though state institutions are taking 
positive initiatives to create investment interest, the financial support is not at a satisfying 
level, and is also surrounded by criteria that make it difficult for the entrepreneur to take 
advantage of this support. It has also been shown that the Labour Law and social security 
planning are strongly affecting the economy of private companies through comprehensive 
efforts in creating job security and a progressive welfare offer. Even though micro size firms 
are exempt from many of these regulations, and could therefore be assumed to take a role in 
expanding private sector, such firms are not able to undertake expensive investments in 
human capital development. If they would expand their business they would also soon fall 
under the regulations for larger companies, and would be affected by the same rigidities as 
larger companies. Thus, because there exist labour market regulations that affect the economy 
of establishments severely, the companies who are the largest employers of educated labour 
force face a large risk when investing in human capital development. Because the rigidities 
are economically demanding it is also difficult for a firm to afford such an investment in the 
first place. Sevilir argued that the entrepreneurship created through investment in human 
capital is one of the main factors to sustained economic growth in the United States. Such 
entrepreneurship is difficult to create without an already established firm’s possibilities to 
make investments in human capital. Thus, as long as such rigidities constitute a problem for 
private sector firms in Iran, such development will be difficult to undertake, and the labour 
demand will remain limited.  
However, what is also important is that there is interest among the highly educated to 
use their efforts in private sector. The literary sources to this study suppose that the 
difficulties facing private sector development today also restrict the willingness to undertake 
such investments. Though this is to some extent verified through the low level of economical 
development in companies that are expected to take most advantage of human capital today, 
the survey conducted in chapter 3 shows a more positive attitude toward both private sector 
employment and entrepreneurship. Most importantly, the survey shows that human capital not 
necessarily is bound up to state institutions, and that if the conditions for economical growth 
in private sector were improved, the employment potential in private sector would increase 
significantly.  
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Appendix 1: Results of multiple-choice survey, Free Islamic University of Zanjan 
 
PERSONAL INFORMATION 
 
5 men  0 married General age: 21.2  Lowest age: 19 
5 women 10 unmarried Median age: 21  Highest age: 26    
 
UNIVERSITY 
 
All study at the Free Islamic University in Zanjan 
 
IF YOU ARE STUDYING AT A FREE ISLAMIC UNIVERSITY, WHY DID YOU CHOOSE THIS 
UNIVERSITY? 
4:  I wanted to study at the Free Islamic University 
5: I was not accepted at the state university 
1: The subject I wanted to study was not available at a state university 
 
SUBJECT OF STUDY 
10: Technology and engineering 
 
DEGREE 
10:  Bachelor (all are studying for the bachelor’s degree) 
 
WHAT IS MORE IMPORTANT 
2: To have a university degree 
8: To study something that is in your own interest 
 
WHY DID YOU CHOOSE THIS SUBJECT? 
4: Personal interest 
6: The possibility of getting a job 
0: The availability of this subject in the university 
0: Social causes 
 
HAVE YOU HAD A JOB DURING THE STUDYING PERIOD? 
3: Yes   (3 men) 
7: No   (5 women, 2 men) 
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IF YOU ARE OFFERED A JOB THAT IS NOT CONNECTED TO THE SUBJECT OF YOUR 
STUDIES, DO YOU ACCEPT THIS JOB? 
5: Yes   (2 women, 3 men) 
4: No   (3 women, 1 man) 
One unanswered 
 
IN THE EVENT OF ACCEPTING A JOB, WHAT IS MORE IMPORTANT? 
2: Job security  (2 women) 
7:  Personal satisfaction (3 women, 4 men) 
2: Good salary  (2 men, one has double crossed with personal satisfaction) 
0:  Other 
 
WHICH ONE GIVES MORE POWER (IN THE MEANING OF AUTHORITY)? 
4: Public sector  (2 women, 2 men) 
5: Private sector  (3 women, 2 men) 
1: None   (1 man) 
 
IF YOU CHOSE PRIVATE OR PUBLIC SECTOR, WHY DID YOU FIND THIS TO GIVE MORE 
POWER? 
 
WILL THE POWER A JOB GIVES BE IMPORTANT FOR YOU? 
6: Yes   (4 women, 2 men) 
1: No   (1 man) 
3: Unanswered   (1 woman, 2 men) 
DO YOU HAVE MORE CONFIDENCE IN AN EMPLOYEE FROM PUBLIC OR PRIVATE SECTOR? 
4: Public sector  (3 women, 1 man) 
4: Private sector  (4 men) 
2: None   (2 women) 
 
IF YOU CHOSE PUBLIC OR PRIVATE SECTOR, WHY DO YOU HAVE MORE CONFIDENCE IN 
THIS SECTOR? 
 
IN THE EVENT OF ACCEPTING A JOB, IS THE FIXED SUM OF HOLIDAY OR REWARD BONUS 
PAID BY THE EMPLOYER IMPORTANT (BONUSES)? 
7: Yes   (4 women, 3 men) 
2: No   (1 woman, 1 man) 
1: Unanswered  (1 man) 
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WHICH IN THE CASE OF HOLIDAY OR REWARD BONUS DO YOU MEAN IS BETTER? 
2: Pr. sector  (1-5 empl.) (2 women) 
1: Pr. sector (6-10 empl.) (1 man) 
0: Pr. sector (11-49 empl.) 
2: Pr. sector (50-99 empl.)  (1 woman, 1 man) 
4: Public sector  (2 women, 2 men) 
1: Unanswered  (1 man) 
 
IF YOU COULD CHOOSE, IN WHAT SECTOR WOULD YOU PREFER TO WORK? 
7: Private sector  (3 women, 4 men) 
3: Public sector  (2 women, 1 man) 
 
IF YOU ARE NOT EMPLOYED ANYWHERE AFTER YOUR STUDIES HAVE FINISHED, WOULD 
YOU CONSIDER ESTABLISHING A PRIVATE COMPANY? 
7: Yes   (2 women, 5 men) 
0: No, I continue searching 
3: Don’t know  (3 women) 
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7.2 Appendix 2: Form for multiple-choice survey, Free Islamic University of Zanjan 
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Personal interviews, February – June 2007  
 
10 students at Zanjan Free Islamic University 
 
Barmaki, Amir Hossein: Coordination Analyst, UNDP Tehran 
 
Erdbrink, Thomas: Middle East journalist for Dutch news agency 
 
Faraz, Arash: Worker’s House (A0%5F) 
 
Farzin, Ali: Programme Specialist and Head of Human Development Department, UNDP Tehran. 
 
Farzin, Farshid: Earlier analyst at Atieh Bahar (private business consulting company). 
 
Imani, Hossein: Assistant Professor at Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Tehran. 
 
Khaleghy, Arman: Head of Iran House of Industry and Mines. 
 
Khodaverdi, Ahmad: Economist at Zanjan Management and Planning Organisation 
 
Military guard, Rasht 
 
Omidvar, Ali Reza: Independent consultant. Earlier analyst at Atieh Bahar (private business consulting 
company).  
 
Satvaty, Jaafar: Director, Department of International Affairs, National Youth Organisation. 
 
Students in IT engineering at Zanjan Free Islamic University 
 
Unemployed accountant, Tehran. 
 
Zarifi, Mohammad: Ministry of Labour.  
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